Israel’s Renewed Focus on Syria – Georgetown Security Studies Review

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This is a guest post written by Alabbas Alsudani.

On November 27, 2024, at 4:00 AM, a ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, brokered by the United States and France, was announced to take effect. The same day that the Syrian rebellion started. The Syrian Civil War against Bashar Al-Assad’s authoritarian regime, which lasted for 13 years, ended only 11 days later when the Assad regime fell on December 8. Was it a coincidence?

What Led to a Ceasefire?

Two months after the beginning of the Israeli military movement toward southern Lebanon, the Lebanese resistance prevented Israel from securing the area, which ultimately resulted in the ceasefire’s acceptance. Despite Israel’s successes in targeting key Hezbollah leadership and infrastructure, Hezbollah fighters slowed an already stretched IDF’s advance into Lebanon. Through the use of guerilla warfare, fortified locations, and a close relationship with local communities, Hezbollah was able to withstand Israel’s superior weaponry. As civilian losses increased, there was a growing local and international backlash against Israel’s protracted military actions. These considerations intensified calls for moderation and diplomacy. Finally, Israel found it difficult to accomplish some of its strategic goals, such as securing a buffer zone or removing Hezbollah’s control over southern Lebanon which poses a threat to northern Israel. With diplomatic initiatives from the United States and France that echoed international appeals for peace, Israel realized that the costs of extending the conflict outweighed the possible benefits. Instead of representing a military victory, the truce represented a strategic realignment as Israel turned to covert containment and political control tactics in Lebanon.

Syria at the Heart of Global Rivalries

Syria has a pivotal role in the balance of power among the rival actors in the region because of its strategic location, which borders Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey. Because of its ties to Iran and Hezbollah, Israel has long seen Syria as both a threat and an opportunity. A divided Syria may weaken the opposition in the region. Israeli interests could be protected if it controlled portions of Syria, especially the Golan Heights which provides a buffer zone as well as critical water assets and fertile soil

Syria’s centrality in Middle Eastern geopolitics is highlighted by the way that the interests of regional and global powers—such as Israel, the United States, Turkey, Iran, and Russia—intersect to create its political environment. Given that Syria has served as a base for Hezbollah operations and a conduit for Iranian influence, Israel sees it as a security threat. Israel has reportedly assisted rebel groups like Fursan al-Joulan in creating a buffer zone and preventing Iranian-backed forces from gaining ground close to its borders in response to these concerns. Israel has also carried out targeted attacks on Syrian military facilities. Distracted by their involvement in the ongoing war with Israel, Iran and Hezbollah were unable to support Assad. Due to the Assad regime’s vulnerability as a result of this distraction of resources and attention, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) was able to take advantage of the situation and push toward Damascus 

Additionally, the United States has maintained a military presence in Syria, supporting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in their fight against ISIS. Washington seeks to restrict Iran’s influence while accentuating the significance of Syria’s territorial integrity and self-determination. In contrast, Turkey has prioritized preventing the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous region near its borders, as well as the support of Syrian opposition groups and the execution of cross-border military operations.

Furthermore, the political and military landscape of Syria has been shaped by Russia, a major ally of the Syrian regime. Moscow established itself as a mediator between opposing factions, and secured strategic military bases due to its intervention in the conflict, further solidifying its regional influence. On the other hand, Iran continues to utilize its proxy networks to preserve its presence in Syria, thereby emphasizing its dedication to regional dominance. The collective actions of these actors, with competitive geopolitical ambitions, highlight the enduring significance of Syria as a hub of their interactions.

Israel’s Maneuvers after Assad’s overthrow 

Following the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad, Israel initiated its most significant military operations in Syria for the first time since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The 1974 Agreement on Disengagement, which established a demilitarized buffer zone between Israel and Syria, maintained stability for decades. The collapse of Assad’s regime disrupted this equilibrium, compelling Israel to act promptly.  Over approximately 48 hours, Israeli forces conducted more than 350 air and naval strikes that targeted critical Syrian military infrastructure, such as air defense systems, weapons depots, and naval bases. Precision-guided missile shipments were destroyed in a major air campaign conducted near Damascus. Mount Hermon, a strategic high ground with critical surveillance capabilities, was captured by ground forces as they entered the buffer zone. Reports also suggest that Israel employed drones and cyber warfare technologies to disrupt communications and turn off Syrian radar systems. Furthermore, Israeli intelligence operations were allegedly expanded in southern Syria to provide support to rebel factions to establish a security buffer. These interventions emphasize Israel’s resolve to prevent its adversaries from exploiting Syria’s power vacuum to pose new threats along its borders. 

Even prior to the fall of Assad’s regime, evidence has emerged that illustrates the relationship between Israel and the Syrian opposition groups such as HTC, SDF, and others. For example, Elizabeth Tsurkov, the Israeli researcher kidnapped by an Iraqi militia in July 2023, disclosed both in 2023 and in 2018 that Israel directly finances 12 Syrian opposition factions and affiliated militias. Israel has maintained its focus on Syria. The fall of Assad’s regime received high-level attention from the Israeli government. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, hailed the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime as “a historic day in the history of the Middle East” a day after the fall. Furthermore, HTS’s maneuvers aligned with some of Israel’s goals, providing Israel with a key opportunity to strengthen its strategic position in the neighboring border areas. On December 29, approximately 20 days after the regime fell, Al-Jolani, in an interview with Al Arabiya TV, emphasized that HTS’s move toward Damascus was a necessity to maintain stability in the region and reduce Iranian influence in Syria

Conclusion

The rapid fall of Assad and the redoubling of Israel’s efforts in Syria suggest that Israel’s involvement in Syria went beyond merely seizing an opportunity—it actively contributed to shaping the outcome. After years of facing staunch resistance from Hezbollah in Lebanon, Israel turned its focus eastward, where the unraveling of Assad’s regime offered a new pathway to secure its interests and reassert its regional influence. Evidence points to significant Israeli support for Syrian opposition groups like HTS, including funding, weapons, and medical aid. These actions, while often framed as defensive or strategic, reveal a deliberate effort to destabilize the Assad regime. Israel’s approach appears to have been multifaceted: undermining a hostile regime, countering Iranian and Hezbollah influence, and exploiting the fragmented Syrian state to establish strategic leverage. Syria became central to Israel’s regional strategy, with efforts directed at facilitating Assad’s overthrow and intervening in the power vacuum left behind. Such actions may be reflective of Israel’s future strategy toward Syria, with further efforts to play a part in Syria’s future.

Views expressed are the author’s own.

Alabbas F. Alsudani holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees in petroleum and energy engineering and a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. He serves as an assistant lecturer in oil and energy economics. He has made many TV appearances and participated in Middle Eastern politics. Currently, he serves as the secretary general of Himam Students Assembly, an Iraqi NGO. Alabbas has published several articles related to Middle East affairs with different publications such as the Yale Review of International Studies, the Oxford Middle East Review, the International Policy Digest, the Modern Diplomacy, and others.